



ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE 
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 
GREGORY ABLAVSKY† 
“[A]re not the people in this territory in a much worse situation, than the 
United States were, before the late revolution?”1 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1631 
I. CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITY IN THE NORTHWEST 
TERRITORY ........................................................................... 1638 
A. Military Jurisdiction over Civilians .............................................. 1638 
B. Civil Jurisdiction over the Military ............................................... 1641 
C. The Military, Jurisdiction, and Administrative Constitutionalism ..... 1649 
II. “GONE TO THE UNITED STATES”: FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 
IMPERIAL LAW, AND THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY ............... 1652 
A. Unequal Footing ........................................................................ 1653 
B. Constitutionalism and the American Empire ................................. 1660 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 1665 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1934, four “organic laws” of the United States have prefaced the 
volumes of the U.S. Code: the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of 
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Confederation, the U.S. Constitution, and the Northwest Ordinance.2 
Formally an ordinary statute that established the first federal territory, the 
Ordinance’s exalted company suggests its exceptional status within the 
nation’s constitutional history.3 The Ordinance’s protections of freedom of 
worship, private property, and jury trials, and its ban on “cruel or unusual 
punishments,” all prefigured, sometimes verbatim, the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights.4 Its prohibition on slavery rendered the Ohio River the ostensible 
divide between “free” and “slave” territory,5 while the document’s promise to 
admit the territories as future states “on an equal footing” with other states 
became a foundational principle of federalism.6 And the law’s requirement 
that the “utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians,” even 
as it anticipated that “[I]ndian titles shall have been extinguished,” epitomized 
the contradictory and often hypocritical nature of U.S. settler colonialism.7 
But, while historians and legal scholars have thoroughly explored the 
Ordinance’s quasi-constitutional aspects, they have largely ignored most of 
 
2 1 U.S.C., at XLV–LXXV (2012). 
3 For the original text of the Ordinance, see 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 
1774–1789, at 334-43 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) [hereinafter NORTHWEST ORDINANCE]. The 
Ordinance was reenacted after the adoption of the Constitution with minor alterations to conform 
to the new constitutional system. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51-53. 
4 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 340. For examples of recent works that read the 
Ordinance in light of the Constitution, see generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 258-62 (2012); 
PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 
(1987); Matthew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409 
(2013); Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 929 (1995); Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 1820 (2011). 
5 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 343. Multiple scholars have traced how this 
provision nonetheless failed to eliminate slavery in the Northwest Territory and the states carved 
from it. See generally M. SCOTT HEERMAN, THE ALCHEMY OF SLAVERY: HUMAN BONDAGE AND 
EMANCIPATION IN THE ILLINOIS COUNTRY, 1730–1865 (2018); MATTHEW SALAFIA, SLAVERY’S 
BORDERLAND: FREEDOM AND BONDAGE ALONG THE OHIO RIVER (2013); Paul Finkelman, 
Slavery and the Northwest Ordinance: A Study in Ambiguity, 6 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 343 (1986). 
6 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 342; accord Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579-80 
(1911) (ruling that Congress cannot require conditions for admission to the Union that would impair 
a new state’s equal standing). On this aspect of the Ordinance, see Robert S. Hill, Federalism, 
Republicanism, and the Northwest Ordinance, 18 PUBLIUS 41, 49 (1988) (“The commitment to equal 
statehood has the character of a sacred pledge.”); Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous 
History of a Constitutional Principle, 18 PUBLIUS 53, 54-57 (1988) (explaining how the Court 
constitutionalized the “equal footing” principle by prohibiting restrictive state admission 
conditions). 
7 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 337, 340. For discussion of the Ordinance’s 
implications for Native peoples, see Robert F. Berkhofer, Americans Versus Indians: The Northwest 
Ordinance, Territory Making, and Native Americans, 84 IND. MAG. HIST. 90, 92-95 (1988); Jack N. 
Rakove, Ambiguous Achievement: The Northwest Ordinance, in THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: 
ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS, AND LEGACY 1, 2 (Frederick D. Williams ed., 1989). 
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what the Ordinance actually did: create a structure of governance.8 In the 
Ordinance, Congress delegated executive, legislative, and judicial power over 
the Northwest Territory, subject to limits imposed by Congress, to five 
presidentially selected and congressionally confirmed federal officials: a 
governor serving a three-year term; a secretary (effectively lieutenant 
governor) serving a four-year term; and three judges who served during good 
behavior.9 The governor and judges collectively served as the territorial 
legislature, at least until there were “five thousand free male inhabitants,” when 
the Ordinance authorized an elected “general assembly.”10 Until that point, too, 
the territorial governor appointed all local “magistrates and other civil officers.”11 
Viewed anachronistically, territorial government under the Ordinance 
strongly resembled the modern administrative state: it explicitly empowered 
federal officials within the executive branch12 to exercise “binding legislative 
and judicial power” over U.S. citizens.13 Yet surprisingly, the early history of 
the territories has played almost no role in the intensifying scholarly debates 
over administrative law’s constitutional legitimacy.14 Even scholars who 
 
8 See generally R. Douglas Hurt, Historians and the Northwest Ordinance, 20 W. HIST. Q. 261 
(1989) (providing an overview of the Ordinance’s historiography). As Hurt notes, an older strand of 
scholarship did focus on the imposed and arguably undemocratic nature of the Ordinance. See id. at 
267-69. 
9 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 335-36. The reenactment of the Ordinance after 
the Constitution’s ratification substituted presidential for congressional appointment of territorial 
officials. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 50, 52-53. 
10 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 336-37. 
11 Id. 
12 The territorial governor and secretary were officers of the United States who reported to the 
Secretary of State. The status of territorial courts and judges was unstated, but the evidence strongly 
suggests that they were not considered part of the Article III judiciary, as the Court would later rule. 
See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (describing territorial courts as “legislative 
Courts” as opposed to “constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power [is] conferred by the 
Constitution”). As Jerry Mashaw points out, the Salary Act of 1789 listed the “three judges of the 
‘western territory’” as “Executive Officers.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative 
Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1288 (2006). Moreover, although those 
three congressionally appointed territorial judges served during good behavior, NORTHWEST 
ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 336—a provision abandoned in later federal territories—lower court 
territorial judges were unambiguously not Article III judges: they were appointed by the governor 
and served during his pleasure, ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, THE FRONTIER REPUBLIC: IDEOLOGY 
AND POLITICS IN THE OHIO COUNTRY, 1780–1825 65-66 (1986). The Judiciary Act of 1789, which 
established the lower federal courts, contained no mention of the territorial courts, see Act of Sept. 
24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; and, until 1805, there was no provision for appeal from the territorial 
courts to the U.S. Supreme Court, see Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 338, 338-39. 
13 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 4 (2014). 
14 This absence is particularly surprising given that Gary Lawson, one of the strongest critics 
of the constitutionality of administrative law, has also written extensively on the constitutional law 
of American empire. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: 
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (2004); Gary Lawson, The Rise and 
Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (opining that “[t]he post-New 
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recognize the broad scope of early federal administrative practice posit the 
existence of a constitutional “hole where administration might have been,”15 
notwithstanding the Constitution’s grant of power to Congress to craft “all 
needful Rules and Regulations” for federal territories16—a provision adopted, 
James Madison suggested, specifically to validate the Northwest Ordinance.17 
This omission of the territories from discussions of administrative law’s 
history reflects two related assumptions. The first is that early federal 
territorial governance, although authorized by Congress, actually rested on 
“local legislative power that comes from below.”18 Superficially, the 
Ordinance’s language supports this claim: it closely resembled state 
constitutions grounded in popular sovereignty and even purported to be an 
“unalterable” “compact” between existing and future states.19 Yet in reality, 
the Ordinance imposed and staffed a government almost entirely from above. 
The people governed by the Ordinance had no say in its creation or adoption: 
Congress enacted it without any process for ratification or assent, and 
territorial citizens lacked voting representation in Congress. Governance 
within the Territory was also arguably undemocratic. Until the territory’s 
population reached 5,000 white men, at which point the Ordinance 
authorized an elected legislature (its sole concession to self-governance), 
there were no territorial officials selected by, or representing, the governed.20 
As the U.S. Attorney General wrote in 1799, “[t]he governor and all persons 
in authority [in the Northwest Territory] derive their authority from the 
present constitution of the United States or from Congress . . . .”21 
The second and related assumption is that the territories were 
exceptional, “anomalous zones” whose governance through federal fiat 
 
Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to 
nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution”). 
15 JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 29-33 (2012); but see Maggie McKinley, 
Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L. J. 1538, 1600-11 (2018) (rooting the 
subsequent administrative state—which she dubs the “participatory state”—in the Petititons Clause). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
17 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 191-92 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
18 HAMBURGER, supra note 13, at 389-90; see also William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article 
III, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 12-20), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3194945 [https://perma.cc/P4WS-7QCH] 
(arguing that territorial courts exercise the judicial power of their territory rather than of the United 
States). The Supreme Court recently rejected the argument that the territories derive their authority 
from popular sovereignty as a matter of doctrine. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 
1874 (2016). 
19 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 339-40. 
20 Id. at 337. 
21 Letter from Attorney General to Secretary of State (Aug. 22, 1799), in 3 THE TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 66, 66-67 (Clarence Edward Carter ed., 1934). 
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reflected expediency rather than constitutional principle.22 Some 
commentators have even suggested that large swaths of the Northwest 
Ordinance are unconstitutional, an odd claim for a text long thought to be 
foundational to U.S. constitutional thought.23 Not only does such an 
approach improbably disregard what the drafters of the Constitution 
repeatedly said the text meant, it also ignores over two centuries of 
governmental practice, which even those who emphasize textualism concede 
has an important role in constructing constitutional meaning.24 As for the 
suggestion that the territories were a minor exception to “normal” structures 
of constitutional governance, this assertion, dubiously descriptive of the 
present, is particularly inapposite for the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. As a number of commentators have emphasized, the territories 
represented one of the most significant sites of federal governance in the early 
United States;25 they also empowered Congress, through its control over 
admission to statehood, to dictate the nation’s political future.26 
Consequently, as even a casual glance at U.S. constitutional history reveals, 
the territories were fundamental to nearly every major constitutional 
controversy of the long nineteenth century: most notably slavery,27 but also 
 
22 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 31-58 (2009) (describing how early 
American’ ambitions for geographic expansion “raised quandaries about the relationship between 
territoriality and sovereignty”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
250 (2002) (arguing that the Court’s jurisprudence on the territories “reflected an approach to 
national sovereignty radically different from the concepts of enumerated powers and limited 
government, with powers reserved to the states and the people, that inspired the Constitution”); 
Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1200-01 (1996) (defining an “anomalous 
zone” as “a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying 
fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended”). 
23 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 
853, 907-08, 910 (1990) (explaining that “[a] strict reading of the text and structure of the 
Constitution—my formalist approach—leads to conclusions almost certainly at odds with the 
intentions of most of the relevant participants in the Constitution’s framing and adoption,” including 
an elected territorial legislature and a non-Article III judiciary). 
24 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of 
the government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’”) (citations omitted); William 
Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (tracing how long-established and settled 
practice can “liquidate” the meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions). 
25 See generally BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF 
NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 185-97 (2009); WILLIAM H. 
BERGMANN, THE AMERICAN NATIONAL STATE AND THE EARLY WEST (2012). 
26 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to admit new states into the 
union and requiring its consent for territorial changes to existing states). 
27 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 431-32 (1856) (resolving the 
interconnected questions of federal authority over the territories and the congressional power to bar 
the importation of slaves). 
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religious freedom,28 property ownership,29 racial discrimination,30 
citizenship,31 and the scope and nature of constitutional rights.32 
The language of exception does important work in the present, however, 
because it preserves a particular vision of the “Founding.” Administrative law, 
we are told, was a relic of British legal thought consciously repudiated in the 
American Revolution, which insisted that law be rooted in popular 
sovereignty.33 This forward-looking perspective of a world made anew echoes 
revolutionary-era rhetoric, yet it ignores a more complicated relationship 
between federal governance and its imperial antecedents. As recent legal 
histories have demonstrated, British precedents and thought remained deeply 
entangled within the new nation’s constitutional project.34 
This backward-looking view was particularly significant for territorial 
governance. Often discussed as the “colonies” of the new nation,35 the 
territories directly raised the question of how the center could legitimately 
govern the periphery—the questions of imperial constitutional structure that 
had prompted the Revolution. Early Americans, who routinely spoke of the 
United States as an empire,36 recognized this parallel. As James Monroe 
stated of an early version of what became the Northwest Ordinance, “It is in 
 
28 See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 49, 65 (2002) (describing 
Congress’s attempts to intervene in marriage practices in the Territory of Utah). 
29 See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 631, 658-59 (2018) 
(highlighting how the federal government used its authority in the territories to rework the meaning 
of property). 
30 See, e.g., KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE 
STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 223-25, 232 (2010) (describing the 
complicated relationship between African Americans and the territorial government and ways in 
which African Americans strove to obtain racial equality). 
31 See, e.g., SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND 
EMPIRE (2018) (recounting litigation over the citizenship status of residents in the U.S. territories). 
32 See infra Part II. 
33 See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 13. 
34 For works exploring the interrelationship between pre-revolutionary precedents and 
subsequent constitutional practice in the early United States, see generally MARY SARAH BILDER, 
THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004); 
DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830 (2005); and ALISON L. LACROIX, 
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 44-59, 79-80 (2010). 
35 See infra Part II.A. 
36 For the uses of the term “empire” and its meanings in the early United States, see PETER 
S. ONUF, JEFFERSON’S EMPIRE: THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 53-61 (2000); 
JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 11 (2002). 
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effect to be a colonial govt similar to that w[hic]h prevail’d in these States 
previous to the revolution . . . .”37  
The early territories reveal, then, the limits of popular sovereignty in the 
United States—not only because, as present-day scholars have stressed, the 
nation explicitly excluded women, African-Americans, and Native peoples 
from governance, but also because territorial governance failed to include the 
people, however narrowly defined, in making the laws that governed them. 
Unlike most present-day commentators, territorial citizens readily grasped 
this imperial aspect of the Northwest Ordinance, which proved controversial. 
Territorial politics, wracked by intense constitutional debates, sometimes 
made it seem as though the American Revolution had never really ended, as 
territorial citizens litigated issues that the war had supposedly settled. Here, 
I focus on two particularly contentious questions of the 1790s with close 
parallels in the imperial crisis: the relationship between military and civil 
authority, and the uncertain jurisdictional and constitutional status of the 
territories within the United States.  
Yet, for all that territorial constitutional debates closely resembled 
revolutionary controversies, they unfolded quite differently. The key 
difference was not the existence of a written U.S. constitution: although the 
Northwest Territory actually had two authoritative constitutional documents, 
given the Ordinance’s claim to fundamental law, constitutional argument 
there maintained the eclecticism of sources that had long characterized early 
American constitutionalism.38 What marked the Northwest Territory, rather, 
was the limited institutional scope for these constitutional arguments. Until 
1805, for instance, there was no appeal from territorial courts to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.39 Congress and the executive both enjoyed considerable 
power over the territories, but both, preoccupied by geopolitics, showed little 
interest in intervening in quotidian local disputes. The outcome was a sort of 
administrative constitutionalism by default, as the governor, secretary, and 
judges/legislators often had to hash out these questions themselves. Their 
arguments produced much disagreement but little resolution: Secretary of State 
Edmund Randolph dismissively referred to the territory’s records as “little 
more, than a history of bickerings and discontents.”40 
 
37 Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MONROE 298, 298-99 (Daniel Preston & Marlena C. DeLong eds., 2006). 
38 See generally JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). 
39 See Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212, 214 (1803) (ruling that the Supreme Court 
could not take a case from the Northwest Territory because an “act of congress had not authorized 
an appeal or writ of error”), superseded by statute, Act of March 3, 1805, supra note 11 (authorizing the 
Supreme Court to review appeals from territorial courts). 
40 Letter from Secretary of State to President (Jan. 4, 1794), in 2 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 472, 472-73 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1934). 
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Ironically, these bickerings were among the earliest discussions of some 
of the most fundamental constitutional questions in U.S. history, issues that 
endure into the present. But this history of early debate in the territories was 
lost. One consequence of ignoring this early administrative constitutionalism 
is the assumption, beginning with the Louisiana Purchase and going forward, 
that questions about, for instance, the Constitution’s geographic scope, were 
new, the result of changed circumstances. In fact, as the history presented 
here suggests, the uncertainties and contradictions raised by territorial 
governance existed from the beginning. 
I. CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITY IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 
The early U.S. Army was small. Even at the height of the war against the 
Northwest Indian Confederacy in the early 1790s, the army only amounted to 
a few thousand soldiers.41 Yet the army loomed large in the Northwest 
Territory, where nearly the entire federal military was stationed. Part of what 
made the Northwest Territory an imperial space was the presence of federal 
military power, with the attendant threat of raw force and violence. 
The existence of the military in the midst of civilians made for an uneasy 
division of authority. In particular, two interrelated constitutional issues 
arose. The first was the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians; the 
second was the extent to which civil authority extended over internal military 
matters. Both raised uncomfortable memories of the imperial crisis in a 
nation that had decried British tyranny for “render[ing] the Military 
independent of and superior to the Civil power.”42 Drawing the boundaries 
between military and civil authority plagued the Territory with “jostleings of 
the executive, judicial, and military powers”—a contest “always pregnant with 
evils,” in the words of one territorial judge.43 
A. Military Jurisdiction over Civilians 
Anglo-American law, especially as interpreted by the citizens of the new 
nation, was hostile to military rule, with its connotations of despotism. 
Anxieties over a standing army figured prominently in Anti-Federalist 
critiques of the Constitution, and suspicion of military authority remained 
 
41 On the history of the early federal military, see generally RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND 
SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN 
AMERICA, 1783–1802 (1975). 
42 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776). 
43 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Winthrop Sargent (June 30, 1792), in Winthrop Sargent 
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3). 
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widespread.44 But, while some in the Washington Administration shared this 
skepticism, others, particularly Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton and Secretary of War Henry Knox, regarded the creation of a 
functional national army as one of the core purposes of the new Constitution. 
To them, the military’s hierarchical, top-down structure promised the “energy” 
for enforcing federal law lacking under the Articles of Confederation.45 
The use of the army for law enforcement was particularly prominent in 
the Northwest Territory prior to the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance, 
when no formal civil authority existed. To fill this jurisdictional void, 
Congress granted the military exceptional authority, charging it with 
expelling illegal settlers from lands north of the Ohio River.46 One army 
commander, relishing the opportunity to “give them [the settlers] federal 
Law,” ordered his soldiers to evict settlers, destroy their crops, and burn their 
homes.47 This pattern persisted throughout the existence of the Northwest 
Territory: in 1799, Joshua Fleeheart had his salt works on Indian land completely 
destroyed by the army, allegedly resulting in over $2000 in damages.48 
The army’s status as the only Anglo-American institution with 
jurisdiction over much of the Northwest Territory also led the military to act 
as a quasi-judicial institution. In one case, there being “no tribunal” under 
civil law, the commander at a local fort, Captain Asheton, made himself judge 
in a local debt dispute.49 Finding for the debtor, this ad hoc proceeding 
ordered that the creditor receive forty lashes for taking the debtor’s axe as 
partial repayment of the debt.50 
Even after the enactment of the Northwest Ordinance, army officers were 
loath to concede the authority they had amassed. Some officials asserted that 
the long-settled French habitants of the region favored military rule: “the 
 
44 See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE 
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 28 (1999) (identifying “[f]ears about the creation 
of a standing army” as one of Anti-Federalists’ five main critiques of the Constitution); KOHN, supra 
note 41, at 73-88 (stressing “public apprehension about standing armies” in constitutional debates). 
45 See KOHN, supra note 41, at 54-72 (describing the weaknesses of the Confederation-era 
military); see also MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 47-58 (2003) (arguing 
that the creation of a “fiscal-military state” was one of the purposes of the Constitution). 
46 Congress later codified this authority in the Trade and Intercourse Acts. See Act of May 19, 
1796, ch. 30, § 5, 1 Stat. 469, 470; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 5, 1 Stat. 329, 330. 
47 Letter from Josiah Harmar to Henry Knox (Aug. 4, 1786), in Josiah Harmar Papers, (on file 
with the Clements Library, University of Michigan, Vol. 28, Letterbook A). 
48 See Affidavit, Flaherty v. Chribbs (May 1, 1801), (on file with Knox County Public Library, 
Vincennes, Ind., Knox County Court File Box 7, File 562), 
http://visions.indstate.edu:8888/cdm/ref/collection/ving/id/11900 [https://perma.cc/H4N2-GLC3]. 
49 Letter from Michael Lacassagne to George Washington (Oct. 26, 1789), in 4 PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 229, 229-32 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1993), available 
at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0162 [https://perma.cc/XC75-72HY]. 
50 See id. 
 
1640 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1631 
command or order of the Military commandant is better law and spedier [sic] 
justice for them & what they prefer,” one territorial judge reported, “to all 
the legal systems found in Littleton and Blackstone.”51 Officers were also 
dubious about the efficacy of civil institutions in the Territory. In the raucous 
Anglo-American settlements newly made along the Ohio River, the 
inhabitants’ “uncontrouled–Licentiousness [sic]” supposedly made it 
impossible to govern them through juries, constables, and justices of the 
peace.52 “[W]e Shall never have good government in this County,” one local 
magistrate grumbled, “till we have a Military Establishment to enforce the 
laws and Create Respect for the Government.”53 
Yet the principal argument advanced in favor of military jurisdiction was 
necessity. Exercising military authority over civilians under a “free 
Government,” was, territorial secretary Winthrop Sargent acknowledged, 
“very delicate,” yet the military was the only institution capable of exercising 
authority in a place “totally destitute of the Benefits of civil Law & 
Magistrates.”54 A military officer similarly argued that the Territory’s “present 
situation” made military authority “necessary.”55 “Civil Law is an admirable 
institution any where,” the officer wrote, “except on a frontier situated in the 
center of an Indian Country and in a time of War.”56 
Territorial citizens sharply disagreed. Steeped in the imperial crisis, they 
insisted that military authority over civilians was “subversive of those 
principles established by the American revolution.”57 At every turn, military 
and federal officials confronted citizens wielding legal arguments against their 
jurisdiction. The “intruders” living north of the Ohio, for instance, bitterly 
protested that the military lacked the authority to remove them.58 One of the 
most heated responses came from Michael Lacassange, a Kentucky merchant 
who wrote directly to President Washington to protest Captain Asheton’s 
intervention in the debt dispute (which involved two of Lacassagne’s 
tenants).59 Surely the President would not permit an American citizen to be 
 
51 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Robert Morris (June 22, 1790), in THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN CLEVES SYMMES 290, 290 (Beverley Bond, Jr. ed., 1926) 
52 Letter from Acting Governor Sargent to Governor St. Clair (Feb. 12, 1793), in 2 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 40, at 433. 
53 Letter from William St. Clair to Arthur St. Clair (Oct. 25, 1794), in Arthur St. Clair Papers 
(on file with the Ohio Historical Society, Roll 4). 
54 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to John Francis Hamtramck (July 16, 1790), in 3 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 21, at 321. 
55 Letter from John Francis Hamtramck to Secretary of War (Mar. 31, 1792), in 2 TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS, supra note 40, at 381. 
56 Id. at 381. 
57 Lacassange to Washington, supra note 49. 
58 ONUF, supra note 4, at 28-33. 
59 See Lacassange to Washington, supra note 49. 
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deprived of rights purchased through “so much blood and treasure” in the 
Revolution.60 To such a citizen, Lacassange asserted, being subjected to the 
arbitrary punishment of a military officer like Asheton “must be worse than 
death itself.”61 
As these instances demonstrate, civilians constantly challenged military 
efforts to claim jurisdiction over them. In these contests, complaints to 
superiors sometimes proved an effective check against perceived military 
overreach. Lacassange’s complaint, for instance, produced an investigation 
and a court of inquiry (which apparently ultimately vindicated Asheton),62 
while allegations that Northwest Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair had 
overstepped his authority prompted a cautionary letter from President 
Washington warning him to exercise “the utmost circumspection.”63 Even on 
a distant frontier, federal officials were well aware of scrutiny of their actions 
from Philadelphia, which often served as the most effective limit on their 
behavior. 
Yet appeals to the administration took months, even years, to resolve, if 
they were ever addressed at all. Many inhabitants of the territory turned to 
what seemed a speedier source of justice: local magistrates and courts. As a 
result, the question of military jurisdiction over civilians quickly transformed 
into a fight over the scope of civilian jurisdiction over the military; it also 
became a bitter struggle among territorial officials. 
B. Civil Jurisdiction over the Military 
Federal officials in the Northwest Territory had sharply differing views on 
the proper relationship between military and civil authority. The Territory’s 
executives, Governor Arthur St. Clair and Secretary Winthrop Sargent, had 
both served in the Continental Army and now held military as well as civil 
positions in the new federal government.64 Both were deeply committed to 
establishing national authority over a region that the federal government only 
tenuously controlled and believed the military was central to that project. 
Creating a robust military presence, St. Clair argued, would ensure that 
“[t]he People . . . saw and felt that the Government of the Union was not a 




62 See id. at n.3. 
63 Letter from President Washington to Gov. Arthur St. Clair (Jan. 2, 1791), in 2 TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS, supra note 40, at 321. 
64 See CAYTON, supra note 12, at 14-17, 25-26 (providing brief biographies of St. Clair and 
Sargent). 
65 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to the President (Aug. 1789), in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra 
note 40, at 212. 
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They did not advocate for military rule—St. Clair refused calls to use the 
army to enforce civil law because it was “not the business of [the] military”—
but rather embraced a conception of separate spheres in which military and 
civilian authority were kept “perfectly distinct.”66 
This vision of non-interference put St. Clair and Sargent at odds with 
two of the territorial judges, John Cleves Symmes and George Turner. 
Military and civil authority were not coequal, the judges insisted: rather, as 
Symmes stated, “The military force of the nation is always considered as 
subordinate to . . . the civil arm.”67 Symmes went so far as to insist that, rather 
than enjoying any special jurisdictional status, “soldiers are merely members 
of the community,” likening them to “students in a college.”68 
These differing views primed these officials for the confrontations that 
followed. The growth of the Northwest Territory in the early 1790s, as land 
sales lured many Anglo-American settlers down to Ohio, made collisions 
between military and civil jurisdiction even more likely. These tensions 
peaked in Cincinnati, the Territory’s administrative hub and most important 
town.69 As one visitor passing through during this period summarized the 
conflict, “The military want to run things, but the town insists upon its rights 
under the constitution, & in consequence there are frequent quarrels.”70 
The center of these quarrels, and of Cincinnati, was Fort Washington. In 
summer 1791, the fort was a hub of activity, as St. Clair, who was also serving 
as the commander of the First American Legion, prepared to lead an 
expedition into Indian country.71 Living cheek to jowl, soldiers and civilians 
engaged in licit and illicit commerce and altercations, which army 
commanders constantly bemoaned subverted military discipline, particularly 
when alcohol was involved. 
Consistent with his emphasis on noninterference, St. Clair attempted to 
forestall conflicts by establishing sharp jurisdictional boundaries. In August 
1791, he drew a line around Fort Washington.72 Any civilians who elected to 
remain within this district, St. Clair announced, would be considered as 
 
66 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Judge Turner (June 19, 1791), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 
218, 219-20 (William Henry Smith ed., 1882). 
67 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Arthur St. Clair (July 22, 1791), in Arthur St. Clair 
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69 See CAYTON, supra note 12, at 63-67 (recounting the early history of Cincinnati). 
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HECKEWELDER 269 (Paul A. W. Wallace ed., 1958). 
71 See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE VICTORY WITH NO NAME: THE NATIVE AMERICAN 
DEFEAT OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 61-92 (2014). 
72 See Proclamation by His Excellency, Arthur St. Clair (Aug. 23, 1791), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR 
PAPERS, supra note 66, at 211-12. 
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“voluntarily submit[ting] themselves to the military law.”73 Yet St. Clair’s 
effort to separate soldiers from civilians angered Judge Symmes, who informed 
St. Clair that this effort to “subject the Citizens of the territory to Military 
government” exceeded his authority under the Northwest Ordinance.74 
St. Clair and Symmes’s disagreements escalated later that month when a 
deserting soldier accused a civilian named Shaw with encouraging him to 
desert and even supplying him clothes to do so.75 St. Clair clapped Shaw in 
irons; a subsequent search of Shaw’s home unearthed a regimental uniform.76 
Asserting authority under the Secretary of War’s orders to expel intruders 
from the public lands, St. Clair ordered Shaw’s house burnt and Shaw 
banished from the territory.77 
Shaw’s detention quickly surfaced broader jurisdictional tensions. 
Symmes read Shaw’s detention as part of a pattern of “acts of despotic 
complexion”78 that reflected the “superiority which the Governor affected to 
give the military over citizens.”79 It would, Symmes feared, only embolden 
the army’s officers, who already acted as so many petty tyrants, “beating and 
imprisoning citizens at their pleasure.”80 Symmes reported of one officer with 
an “imperious disposition,” Captain John Armstrong, who had often feuded 
with the local sheriff over the “superiority of the civil or military authority.”81 
Now, in the wake of Shaw’s detention, Armstrong reportedly “deridingly t[ook] 
the sheriff by the sleeve, saying: ‘what think you of the civil authority now?’”82 
For his part, Judge Turner intervened in the controversy by issuing a writ 
of habeas corpus for Shaw, even though no complaint had actually been filed 
in his court.83 For early Americans, the writ, which required a judicial hearing 
to determine the legality of a detention, had acquired almost talismanic 
 
73 Id. at 212. 
74 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Arthur St. Clair (July 12, 1791), in Arthur St. Clair 
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78 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Jonathan Dayton, supra note 75, at 149. 
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significance as a check against arbitrary authority,84 and was protected in both 
the U.S. Constitution85 and the Northwest Ordinance.86 But, to Turner’s 
shock, St. Clair refused to honor the writ, claiming that Shaw, as an intruder, 
was “not entitled to the benefit of the Laws of the Land.”87 An outraged 
Turner insisted that the authority of civil law was not geographically limited 
by quasi-military spaces. “I know of no corner or garrison in any county of 
this Territory into which civil process may not run,” he wrote.88 
Because neither St. Clair nor Turner acknowledged the legitimacy of the 
other’s claim to authority, what might have been a judicial dispute became a 
brittle contest of wills that played out in correspondence rather than a 
courtroom. The only option was appeal to some higher authority that both 
might concede enjoyed the power to decide. With no higher court holding 
jurisdiction, territorial officials looked up the administrative chain, to the 
Washington Administration, for vindication. Both St. Clair and Judge 
Symmes voiced their grievances to their higher-ups, while Symmes’s formal 
complaint against Captain Armstrong was dispatched to the President.89 Yet 
the Administration remained silent on these issues, at least publicly. Privately, 
the Secretary of State recommended to the President that these issues be left 
to the local courts to resolve.90 
In the absence of any official resolution, the unsettled question of civil 
jurisdiction over the military resurfaced during the following summer of 1792. 
The army, having suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Northwest 
Indian Confederacy in November, retreated to Cincinnati demoralized and 
fractious.91 General James Wilkinson, who replaced St. Clair as military 
commander (St. Clair remained the governor of the Northwest Territory), 
sought to restore order through vigorous enforcement of military discipline. 
On Wilkinson’s orders, an ensign named Harrison harshly punished an 
 
84 See, e.g., AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF 
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“artificier,” the term for a craftsman who assisted the military.92 The artificier 
then hired two local attorneys, Blanchard and Smith, who filed suit for assault 
against Ensign Harrison in the territorial courts.93 
Angered by this “interference of the civil authority” in internal military 
discipline, General Wilkinson forbade the service of process within Fort 
Washington.94 Claiming a “sacred regard” for “civil rights,” Wilkinson 
nonetheless feared the consequences if his authority over military personnel 
could be second-guessed by magistrates.95 Already, he lamented, “[t]he 
Precedent has infected the Corps of Artificiers & the Soldiers with the Idea 
of licentious Freedom,” threatening “Anarchy & disorder.”96 
Wilkinson appealed to Secretary Sargent, who was acting as governor 
during one of St. Clair’s many absences from the Territory. Sargent disagreed 
with Wilkinson’s implicit assumption that he had the authority to reject civil 
jurisdiction—“[T]here is no Sanctuary from the sovereign Authority of Civil 
Law,” Sargent lectured the General—but he was also hostile to the attorneys’ 
efforts to intervene in military matters.97 Informed of the controversy, 
Secretary of War Knox wrote to Sargent in support, stating his belief that 
“the civil power has nothing to do with military discipline.”98 Sargent then 
wrote Judge Symmes, urging him to “avoid all Infringement of military Police 
so essential to the Existence of an Army” by dismissing the suit.99 
Symmes was an unsympathetic audience for Sargent’s pleas. The judge 
conceded that the civil courts might be barred from interference with military 
justice.100 But whether Harrison fell under military jurisdiction in the first 
place “is most surely the province of a court of justice to determine.”101 In 
other words, civil, not military, authorities held the power to decide the scope 
of their respective jurisdictions. 
 
92 Letter from James Wilkinson to Winthrop Sargent (June 2, 1792), in Winthrop Sargent 
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Symmes hoped “the matter [would] die away altogether.”102 In one sense, 
he got his wish. The Harrison matter, like the Shaw controversy, seemingly 
faded; if there was a court decision, it does not survive. Yet it set the stage for 
another, even more heated confrontation between Symmes and Sargent that 
happened on Christmas that same year. 
This time, the precipitating event was one of surprising legal import in 
the Northwest Territory: the frivolous firing of guns in violation of territorial 
statute. Symmes and Sargent unsurprisingly viewed this action very 
differently. While Symmes saw musket firing as an “immemorial” custom that 
should be indulged,103 Sargent read it as a dangerous practice that led 
territorial citizens to ignore Indian attacks on the mistaken belief they were 
harmless “common Sport.”104 From his first arrival in the Territory, Sargent 
had repeatedly sought, often fruitlessly, to suppress what he believed to be 
riotous behavior.105 
On Christmas 1792, Sargent sought to avoid “disagreement amongst the 
Citizens and military” by relying on the local militia, not the army, to police 
Cincinnati and prevent gunfire.106 Yet the situation, if anything, grew worse, 
producing riots that lasted over two weeks.107 The militia were mocked when 
they tried to make arrests; the only two men apprehended were released 
without bond; and soon, the rioters began shooting into houses.108 Sargent 
knew who the ringleaders were—the lawyer Smith among them—and 
appealed to Judge Symmes for assistance.109 Yet all Sargent got from Symmes 
was a lengthy disquisition on allowing the people their whims. How could 
such behavior be stopped, Symmes lectured, if the people condoned it?110 
“Jurors will not indite—militia guards will not apprehend . . . and I shudder 
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at the Idea of calling in the aid of the regular military; nor am I sure of success 
if we did.”111 
Finally, one night, Thomas McCulloch, himself a militiaman, was 
discovered firing illegally.112 Because McCulloch was subject to military 
justice, Sargent determined to try him before a court martial, imprisoning 
McCulloch in Fort Washington in the interim.113 The example, Sargent 
believed, at last caused peace and quiet to prevail.114 But Smith—the same 
lawyer who filed on behalf of the artificier—quickly became McCulloch’s 
counsel, obtaining a writ of habeas corpus from Judge Symmes.115 Rumor had 
it, though, that Fort Washington’s commandant would refuse to honor the 
writ—in which case, Smith threatened Sargent, he would show that the 
service “cannot be refused.”116 
Word of the habeas writ reached Sargent, along with reports that Smith 
was boasting that he had gathered eighty men ready to free McCulloch.117 
Sargent once again found himself in a difficult situation. If he honored the 
writ, it would have “destroyed even the Shadow of Subordination with the 
militia.”118 Yet if he refused to acknowledge it, the commandant might be 
liable to a suit, and Sargent’s action might be deemed a “most arbitrary 
measure.”119 Sargent decided to preempt the writ by quickly trying 
McCulloch.120 He took the militiaman to his own house for court martial, 
where a panel found McCulloch guilty of disobedience and sentenced him to 
two weeks’ imprisonment.121 
But McCulloch’s conviction did not settle the matter, as Sargent and 
Symmes continued to battle. Sargent angrily complained to Symmes about 
his interference, which he argued merely served to “encrease [sic] the 
Turbulence of the licentious.”122 As it was, Sargent threatened that if 
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necessary, he would suspend the writ of habeas altogether: if he erred, “the 
Sovereign Authority will correct me.”123 Symmes’s response was sparse but 
clear. If Sargent attempted to suspend the writ, the question would come 
before the court.124 Symmes noted only that even the British king could not 
suspend habeas without the legislature’s concurrence.125 Although both 
Symmes and Sargent indicated that they would submit to a decision by the 
Washington Administration, once again the Administration was silent, and 
so the matter went unresolved. 
These recurrent conflicts between the territorial judges and executives are 
susceptible of multiple interpretations. One view—that of the participants in 
the territories—was that they were engaged in a contest over weighty 
principles that followed a well-worn, Revolutionary-era script. The territorial 
judges, especially Symmes, cast themselves as part of a heroic judicial 
resistance against an overreaching and self-aggrandizing executive. For their 
part, St. Clair and Sargent regarded themselves as upholding their duty to 
safeguard the fragile and tentative authority of the new United States as the 
only bulwark against licentiousness and disorder. Another view—widespread 
among those outside the territories, as Edmund Randolph’s dismissive 
remarks suggested126—regarded these conflicts as the petty clash of 
overweening egos. In their correspondence, territorial officials on both sides 
come off as peevish and arrogant, and both judges and territorial executives 
all ultimately suffered ignominious fates, as their hubris undermined their 
subsequent careers.127 
Yet all these readings arguably distort. Although there was little love lost 
between Symmes and Sargent, their fractious conflicts over jurisdiction were, 
at root, structural. Contests between civil and military authority quickly 
recurred, for instance, when the army moved its headquarters from 
Cincinnati to Detroit: at one point, an army officer wielding an axe even 
invaded the home of the county court clerk to recover a runaway sailor, which 
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led to legal maneuverings predictably involving habeas writs.128 General 
Wilkinson responded to these confrontations by declaring martial law over 
the entire town, a move so bold it finally elicited a response from the (now) 
Adams Administration. Warning that “[c]ollison” with “the Civil authority” 
would “produce no good and must be attended with much evil,” Alexander 
Hamilton urged Detroit’s commander to negotiate a resolution.129 
Moreover, even though these struggles pitted judges against executives 
and came clothed in legal garb, they were not, at core, judicial struggles. St. 
Clair, Sargent, and military officials refused to accept the judgments of civil 
courts in part because judicial supremacy was not well established in the Early 
Republic,130 but their skepticism was arguably even more attributable to the 
oddity of territorial government, which made territorial judges into 
legislators and administrators.131 The result was that, in disputes over 
constitutional authority, the judges acted less like impartial mediators than 
combatants, slugging it out with executives not in courtrooms (almost none 
of the disputes resulted in an actual civil proceeding) but in constant 
correspondence. In this litigation by letter, both judges and executives 
claimed to have the law on their side, and yet neither acknowledged the other 
as arbiter of these claims. The only authority they both recognized was not a 
court, but their higher-ups in the Washington Administration. 
In short, although their disagreements resembled judicial politics, 
territorial officials were actually locked in an administrative struggle over 
their respective authority and the meaning of the Northwest Ordinance. The 
continued refusal of their higher-ups to intervene meant that their testy 
debates over constitutional interpretation persisted right up until the 
Territory became a state. 
C. The Military, Jurisdiction, and Administrative Constitutionalism 
In 1802, representatives gathered to draft a constitution for the new state 
of Ohio, to be carved from the Northwest Territory’s eastern portion. The 
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new constitution’s bill of rights contained a provision, copied from other 
states, mandating that “the military shall be kept under strict subordination 
to the civil power.”132 But it also included a further, unprecedented stipulation 
that “no person in this State, except such as are employed in the army or navy 
of the United States or militia in actual service, shall be subject to corporal 
punishment, under the military law.”133 This language suggests the legacy of 
the Cincinnati fights over Shaw and Harrison: in the end, the bickerings of 
the Territory’s administrative constitutionalism seemingly shaped the explicit 
text written into state constitutions. 
Yet Ohio’s constitutional provision was seemingly never tested, and was 
stripped from the state’s Bill of Rights when it was rewritten in 1851.134 The 
provision proved vestigial because, while controversies over military 
jurisdiction had not ended, they had shifted westward, following the bulk of 
the U.S. Army into new federal territories. There, disputes over military 
authority recurred, as did the ambiguity that had marked these controversies 
in the Northwest Territory.135 
This durable uncertainty over the boundaries between civil and military 
authority reflects, in one sense, the failure of administrative constitutionalism 
in the Northwest Territory, at least from the perspective of many of the 
disputes’ participants. Craving finality from some authoritative source that 
they never got, these officials seemed trapped in perpetual argument. This 
lack of conclusiveness was a particular problem for the kind of constitutional 
controversy that plagued the Northwest Territory—the second-order 
question over the authority to adjudicate itself. Territorial officials largely 
agreed that there had to be some military sphere freed from civil control, but 
sharply disagreed over who would determine that space. Military men like 
Wilkinson believed merely acknowledging civil authority subordinated the 
military, while Symmes and his allies insisted that the military had to submit 
to civilian supremacy as a necessary precondition to the protection of its 
autonomy. The insistence on both sides of their sole right to decide made 
compromise impossible. 
Yet the only institution that the participants acknowledged had the 
jurisdiction, legitimacy, and authority to resolve these disputes—the 
“Sovereign Authority of America,” as embodied in Congress and the national 
executive136—remained silent even in the face of constant appeals and 
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complaints. This silence mostly went unexplained, yet there were a handful 
of indirect, yet suggestive, statements. Edmund Randolph’s dismissive 
remarks about territorial “bickerings” indicate that at least some in the 
Administration thought the underlying controversies too transient and local 
to warrant intervention from Philadelphia. Even more telling was Secretary 
of State Jefferson’s response to Judge Symmes’s complaint against Captain 
John Armstrong: a “civil prosecution in the courts of the Territory,” Jefferson 
told the President, was the “most proper” remedy.137 
What these remarks suggest is a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
nature of governance in the Northwest Territory—one based on the 
appealing, yet flawed, analogy between territorial and state governments. 
Implicitly relying on a sharp divide between local and national, Randolph and 
Jefferson sought to keep the federal government free from messy disputes 
they thought best resolved locally. But that was not how authority worked in 
the Northwest Territory, where, as a matter of formal law, legitimate power 
flowed from the center outward. Territorial officials like Symmes intuitively 
understood that when they appealed up the hierarchy for vindication; as 
Symmes knew all too well from experience, civil proceedings against officers 
in territorial courts offered no resolution. 
The problem for all involved was that they seemed to lack the theory or 
language to articulate what they were doing. Just as the Northwest Ordinance 
created a form of administrative law, territorial officials found themselves 
engaged in administrative constitutionalism by default as they sought to fill 
the gaps created by Congress’s broad delegation of authority. None of the 
officials had any doubts about the legitimacy of this endeavor: on the contrary, 
their letters brim with confidence and pious expressions of duty to the font 
of their authority, the sovereign power of the United States. But this 
responsibility, based partly on older imperial models of colonial governance, 
bore an uneasy relationship to newer conceptions of popular sovereignty. 
This tension between territorial governance and early American 
republicanism may seem to echo present-day critiques of the administrative 
state, but that perspective anachronistically ignores post-revolutionary 
contexts. Federal administrators were not alone in seeking new vocabularies 
to justify their actions; their uncertainties reflected the broader struggle in 
the postwar United States to explain how any exercise of state power outside 
popularly elected legislatures was legitimate. Territorial officials’ efforts to 
articulate administrative constitutionalism most closely resembled the better-
documented attempts by judges to explain how judicial review—a process 
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similarly rooted in prior precedents that smacked to many of imperial rule—
was compatible with the rule of the people.138 
The current jurisprudential landscape demonstrates how successful judges 
were in this effort. Over the past several decades, the questions swirling 
around habeas and military authority, particularly in territories controlled by 
the federal government, that arose in Cincinnati have not vanished; if 
anything, they have grown more pressing. Moreover, these matters still 
involve deep tensions between administrative and judicial claims to 
adjudicative authority; the executive and the military still assert immunity 
from civil jurisdiction. But officials no longer feel quite so free to disregard 
judicial determinations. Instead, as these questions have become the subject 
of high-stakes constitutional litigation, the jurisdictional question has been 
heard and answered by the Supreme Court, which has declared itself to have 
the final word. This legal landscape differs sharply from the world of the 
Northwest Territory. There, a handful of contentious and bickering territorial 
officials, neglected by their superiors, struggled to fill the interstices of the 
new constitutional order as best they understood.139 
II. “GONE TO THE UNITED STATES”: FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 
IMPERIAL LAW, AND THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 
In 1795, a local magistrate wrote to territorial secretary Winthrop Sargent, 
who was acting as governor while Arthur St. Clair was away on one of his 
frequent visits to Philadelphia. The magistrate would have written to St. 
Clair directly in Cincinnati, but “I hear he is gone to the U[nited] States.”140 
This odd usage, at least to present-day readers, underscores the multiple 
meanings of “United States” in the late eighteenth century. Sometimes, the 
term referred specifically and only to the thirteen states collectively; in other 
instances, it described the entire territory of the nation of the United States. 
The result was that, depending on the definition used, the territories could 
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be either within or without the United States. This was not an idle semantic 
debate: it had important legal implications hotly argued among federal 
officials, particularly on whether ordinary congressional legislation 
encompassed the territories. Even more significantly, this debate raised the 
fundamental question of how much the new American empire would 
resemble the old British empire, as proponents of earlier imperial practice 
clashed with advocates who embraced newer conceptions of uniform 
territorial sovereignty. 
A. Unequal Footing 
The British model was clear, at least in principle. All of Britain’s overseas 
territories were colonies rather than part of Britain proper, and so excluded 
from the scope of ordinary parliamentary legislation.141 But Britain’s colonies 
were subject to Parliament’s legislative jurisdiction, which Parliament could 
exercise by specifically naming the colonies within the statutory text.142 These 
principles, established over long usage, became contested during the imperial 
crisis. Anglo-Americans increasingly denied Parliamentary legislative 
authority, first by distinguishing power over internal and external legislation, 
and subsequently by arguing that their allegiance lay with the British king 
alone.143 
After their separation from Britain, citizens of the newly-created United 
States spoke of creating their own American empire.144 Yet they used the term 
“empire” differently from its British antecedents. Usually “empire” described 
the extensive territory Anglo-Americans envisioned enfolding within the 
United States; rarely did it imply a system in which an imperial center would 
indefinitely govern the colonial periphery.145 Rather, from the end of the 
Revolution onward, most Anglo-Americans assumed that the western 
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territories would eventually become new states within the union.146 Both the 
Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance codified this view: the 
Constitution granted Congress the power to admit new states,147 while the 
Ordinance promised that the territories would become states on “equal 
footing” with the original thirteen once they reached sixty thousand white 
male inhabitants.148 A sharp break from British law—James Monroe 
described the promise of future statehood as the “remarkable & important 
difference” between the Ordinance and British imperial precedent149—this 
innovation occasioned little debate, perhaps reflecting Anglo-Americans’ 
long-standing experience with the creation of new and co-equal jurisdictions 
such as towns and counties as a consequence of expansion. 
This promise of ultimate statehood on equal terms has long served as the 
principal evidence of the Ordinance’s anti-colonial and democratic 
commitments. But the fact that the territories would eventually become states 
did not resolve the territories’ status within the United States prior to 
admission, a question on which the Constitution and the Ordinance were 
largely silent. In this respect, the system of governance adopted for the 
territorial period broke far less with earlier practice. With an appointed 
governor and judiciary serving on good behavior, a two-house legislature with 
appointed legislative council, and the right of disapproving laws vested in 
Congress, territorial government strongly resembled British imperial 
structures.150 One territorial citizen later described “ordinance Government” 
as a “true transcript of our old English Colonial Governments;” “our 
Governor,” he complained, “is cloathed [sic] with all the power of a British 
Nabob.”151 
As the Ordinance began to operate, territorial officials puzzled over this 
mélange of old and new in thinking through the Northwest Territory’s 
constitutional status. The question of the Territory’s position with respect to 
the United States first emerged as territorial officials struggled to decide 
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whether the Territory’s similarity to British colonies encompassed the rules 
about parliamentary legislation. When Governor St. Clair and the judges for 
the Northwest Territory (who, recall, also initially served as legislators) 
gathered to enact laws for the territory, the judges expressed their “doubts 
. . . whether the Laws of the united States can have course in the Territory 
unless it be especially named in them.”152 The judges suggested formally 
readopting federal statutes to ensure they had force within the Territory.153 
There the matter lay, unresolved, until 1795. The previous year, Congress 
enacted a tax on whiskey and other distilled spirits that had convulsed the 
frontier.154 In passing, Governor St. Clair had earlier written to Secretary of 
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, suggesting that the revenue law did not 
encompass the Territory, which was not named in the law.155 When St. Clair 
repeated this view to Hamilton’s successor Oliver Wolcott, Wolcott could not 
let the claim pass unnoticed.156 He found St. Clair’s suggestion that “the Laws 
of the United States are not deemed to extend to either of the territorial districts unless 
they are specially named” to be “an inadmissable pretension.”157 Wolcott 
forwarded St. Clair’s letter to Attorney General William Bradford, who 
confirmed Wolcott’s view. “There can be no doubt,” Bradford wrote to 
Wolcott, “that all the laws of Congress, unless local in their nature or limited 
in their terms, are, in their operation coextensive with the Territory of the 
United States, and obligatory upon every person therein.”158 Bradford 
reasoned that the Constitution compelled this result, as it required uniform 
duties and imposts throughout the United States.159 He also pointed to 
Article Four of the Northwest Ordinance, which stated that the territory and 
the states formed from it “shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of 
the United States of America.”160 Wolcott forwarded Bradford’s letter to St. 
Clair by way of rebuttal. 
This legal dispute reflected a generational divide. Born in Scotland in 
1737, St. Clair had first come to Pennsylvania as a British officer during the 
 
152 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Attorney General (Dec. 1790), in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, 
supra note 40, at 319. 
153 Id. at 320. 
154 THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 160-61 (1986). 
155 See Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Alexander Hamilton (Aug. 9, 1793), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR 
PAPERS, supra note 66, at 317-18. 
156 See Letter fom Oliver Wolcott to Arthur St. Clair (June 20, 1795), in id. at 385. 
157 Id. (emphasis in original). 
158 Letter from Attorney General to Secretary of the Treasury (June 19, 1795), in 2 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 40, at 520. 
159 Id. at 520-21. 
160 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 341. 
 
1656 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1631 
Seven Years’ War.161 Strongly rooted in earlier imperial law, St. Clair 
responded to Wolcott’s dismissal of his argument by observing that, whatever 
its merits, his claim was “no new pretension—and is a Doctrine which has 
long been held with respect to colonies—and those Districts [the 
territories] . . . have ever been considered in congress as colonies.”162 Wolcott 
and Bradford, by contrast, were a good deal younger—Wolcott was 35 in 1795; 
Bradford was 40—and had come of age during the American Revolution.163 
Despite formal legal training at the Litchfield Law School, Wolcott claimed 
to have never encountered the principle that St. Clair advanced. “[T]he 
Doctrine is novel to me,” Wolcott told St. Clair, “and as I verily believe 
erroneous.”164 Wolcott promised to “press for a judicial decision as soon as 
possible” to resolve the question.165 
Yet no judicial decision happened, and so, notwithstanding Wolcott’s 
objections, St. Clair’s “pretension” about federal jurisdiction persisted. The 
claim that territories had to be specifically named in federal legislation proved 
particularly appealing whenever federal statutes veered toward echoes of the 
imperial crisis because it allowed officials to avoid enforcing unpopular laws. 
So, when Congress passed a stamp tax in 1797, a territorial magistrate wrote 
to Secretary Sargent of his “Doubts” as to whether the Act encompassed “this 
Territory . . . not being particularly named.”166 And when Congress prompted 
a constitutional crisis with the enactment of the Sedition Act in 1798, Arthur 
St. Clair clung to his old views in a letter to the Secretary of the State on the 
law. “It has been assumed as a principle,” St. Clair wrote, “and it is, perhaps, 
not an ill founded one, t[hat] the general Laws of the Union do not extend to 
the territorial dependents except in cases where they are expressly named.”167 
Displacing responsibility for this seemingly repudiated doctrine, St. Clair 
noted that it was “most probable” that territorial judges would “apply th[is] 
principle” in any prosecutions under the Sedition Act.168 The Secretary of 
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State forwarded St. Clair’s letter along to the new Attorney General, Charles 
Lee, who (likely unwittingly) reiterated Bradford’s earlier position. 
“[S]urprised” by St. Clair’s claim, Lee stated his view that the “true rule” was 
“that the General laws of the Union reach every part of the United States, 
unless a particular and express exception be made.”169 
For all the echoes of the imperial crisis in this debate, however, there was 
an important difference. Unlike the revolutionaries who had denied 
parliamentary authority, neither St. Clair nor the attorneys general sought to 
cabin congressional power over the territories. St. Clair did not even disagree 
with the conclusion that federal law applied uniformly throughout the United 
States. For St. Clair, the relevant question was more fundamental: “whether 
the Territory be a part of the United States” at all.170 In a lengthy letter to 
Wolcott, St. Clair argued that it was “easy to prove” that it was not, and “that 
the legislature have never considered them as such, but, on the contrary, as a 
dependent colony.”171 
St. Clair adduced substantial evidence. He noted that the territory had 
had its government “imposed upon it by . . . [the] States, and if any thing can 
be a proof of inferiority and dependence, it is this very thing.”172 He observed 
that the territory was excluded from the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the lower federal courts.173 And he pointed out that the territory’s 
inhabitants were denied a vote for representative in Congress or any officer, 
which, if they were subject to federal law, seemed to run afoul of the 
revolutionary principle that the “consent of the people” was “essential to give 
laws a binding force.”174 St. Clair even turned on its head Bradford’s argument 
about the pledge, in Article Four of Northwest Ordinance, that the territories 
would forever remain part of the United States.175 This provision, St. Clair 
insisted, was properly read as the “terms on which the colonies shall be 
settled,” and became binding only once the territories sought to become 
states.176 The alternate would suggest that “the United States made a compact 
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with themselves,” which St. Clair thought “too great an absurdity” to be 
conceded.177 For all these reasons, “[t]he truth is, the Territory is a 
dependency of the United States, not as yet an integral part of them, but 
capable of becoming so at a future day.”178 
St. Clair’s conclusion that the territories were colonies of the United 
States, subject to its authority and yet not integrated into the nation, laid bare 
a deep and uncomfortable tension between republican principles and 
territorial governance. For all the language in the Northwest Ordinance about 
“fundamental principles of civil and religious libert[ies],” the Ordinance also 
made the United States imperial in the older, British sense, since territorial 
inhabitants remained subject to a distant government not of their choosing.179 
“[I]f the [territory’s] inhabitants are a part of the people of the United States,” 
St. Clair pointed out, “they are, at least, upon a very unequal footing with 
their brethren.”180 St. Clair’s rhetorical inversion of the Ordinance’s famous 
language about “equal footing” pointed out the large gap between the 
Ordinance’s abstract promises and the realities apparent from a close reading 
of its text. St. Clair’s proposed solution to this problem of inconsistency—
excising the territories from the United States altogether by labeling them 
colonies—had the advantage of resolving the contradictions by creating 
explicit boundaries of belonging that would serve to explain why so many 
fundamental rights of self-governance seemed to be denied territorial 
citizens. But St. Clair’s logical conclusion that U.S. inhabitants who moved 
to territories “ceased to be the citizens of the United States and became their 
subjects” was deeply unsettling in a nation created in an anti-imperial 
revolt.181 
Many inhabitants of the Northwest Territory came to agree with St. Clair 
about their status, although they put a different valence on it. By 1800, the 
personal and local disputes within the Territory had been enveloped within a 
thick blanket of partisanship, as local factions aligned with the political parties 
that had arisen in Philadelphia.182 A vocal movement of Jeffersonians, weary 
of St. Clair and his chokehold on patronage, sought to replace the governor.183 
Yet they began to fear that replacing St. Clair might only “be exchanging an 
old and feeble tyrant for one more active and wicked.”184 So their critique 
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broadened to encompass territorial government more generally. “They were 
tired of the Colonial Yoke,” one wrote to President Jefferson;185 another stated 
that he “reckon[ed] territorial government” as “a despotism.”186 
In response to the clamor, in 1802 Congress enacted a law authorizing the 
Territory to hold a constitutional convention in preparation for statehood.187 
As St. Clair fought for his political life, he abandoned his earlier acceptance 
of congressional authority. Instead, he adopted the prerevolutionary logic 
denying parliamentary jurisdiction into his doctrine of territorial jurisdiction. 
Congress, St. Clair argued, had legislative jurisdiction over the Territory in 
its “corporative capacity,” but it lacked authority over the Territory’s “internal 
affairs,” in which the Territory’s own legislature was competent.188 Congress’s 
act requiring a convention, then, was a “nullity,” and the Territory’s 
inhabitants were no more obligated by it “than we would be bound by an edict 
of the first consul of France.”189 St. Clair’s airing of these platitudes of the 
American Revolution led the Jefferson Administration to rapidly remove the 
Federalist from office, even though he had mere weeks still to serve, for his 
challenge to congressional authority.190 As for St. Clair’s critique, Ohio 
gained statehood months later, making his analysis of territorial status moot 
for the residents of the new state. 
The debate over the constitutional status of the Northwest Territory thus 
raged fiercest just as the territorial period was coming to an end. Many 
offered sharply-worded critiques of territorial rule: St. Clair described it as a 
form of government “which has been loaded with every epithet of 
opprobrium which the English language affords.”191 Yet, for territorial 
inhabitants discontented by the lack of self-government, the possibility of 
following codified procedures to gain admission to the union made statehood, 
rather than reform, seem the easier solution. The promise of statehood did 
not solve the contradictions of republican imperialism; it obviated them. 
Admission to the Union clarified Ohio’s status, yet, as with the issue of 
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military jurisdiction, the question of the relationship between the territories 
and the United States persisted—somewhere else. 
B. Constitutionalism and the American Empire 
Ohio became a state in February 1803.192 Two months later, the United 
States signed a treaty with France to purchase Louisiana, which encompassed 
much of western North America.193 The governance of the new territory 
quickly proved controversial in Congress, where representatives reprised the 
disagreement between St. Clair and Wolcott over the status of newly acquired 
territory and its residents. Both positions had advocates.194 Many embraced 
Wolcott’s position and insisted that the new territory was fully part of the 
United States, with all the constitutional rights and limitations this 
concession implied. “We must . . . apply the Constitution to that people in 
all cases or in none,” opined one representative.195 “We must consider that 
country as being within the Union or without it—there is no alternative.”196 
But others disagreed, arguing, following St. Clair, that the United States 
could hold Louisiana as a colonial appendage without extending 
constitutional rights or citizenship to its residents. The Constitution, they 
argued, was a compact only among the states and did not encompass the 
territories. “Congress . . . have a power in the Territories which they cannot 
exercise in States,” one representative reasoned, “and the limitations of power, 
found in the Constitution, are applicable to States and not to Territories.”197 
The law that Congress ultimately passed created a government for 
Louisiana similar to that for the Northwest Territory.198 It established several 
presidentially appointed offices—a governor with a three-year term, a 
secretary with a four-year term, and three judges with four-year terms rather 
than life tenure—as well as a separate federally-appointed legislature of 
“thirteen of the most fit and discreet persons of the territory.”199 But, although 
the law’s imposition of a government without consent was not especially 
novel, many thought it was. “This . . . is a Colonial system of government. It 
is the first the United States have established,” John Quincy Adams 
complained in opposing the Louisiana government bill.200 “It is a bad 
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precedent.”201 Present-day commentators have echoed Adams, stressing that 
the Purchase “led to the creation of an ‘American Empire’” and 
“revealed . . . the problematic constitutional status of the territories in a 
United States to be governed of, by, and for the people.”202 
Such comments, which casually excised over a decade of prior debate over 
territorial governance, found their parallel in the U.S. Supreme Court. As it 
happened, February 1803 was also when Court decided what was arguably its 
first case on the constitutional status of the U.S. territories. In Clarke v. 
Bazadone, the Court considered whether it had the power to hear an appeal 
from the General Court of the Northwest Territory, even though that court 
was on the verge of extinction.203 The plaintiff ’s counsel forcefully argued 
that, even though Congress had not specifically authorized the Supreme 
Court to hear such appeals, the Court inherently enjoyed that power as the 
nation’s “one Supreme court.”204 “The very existence of the courts whose 
judgment is complained of, is derived from the United States,” the attorney 
argued.205 “All power and authority exercised in [the Northwest] territory 
have emanated from the United States.”206 Yet, in a sentence-long opinion, 
the Court rejected this position. Even though there were “manifest errors” in 
the record, they concluded that they could not issue a writ of error without 
congressional authorization.207 
The Court’s sparse decision in Clarke implicitly vindicated St. Clair’s 
position: the Court would not second-guess Congress’s power to treat the 
territories differently from states, even if Congress excluded them from 
fundamental constitutional structures.208 Yet Clarke seemed to vanish from 
the Court’s subsequent decisions on territorial status.209 Two decades later, in 
Loughborough v. Blake, Chief Justice John Marshall took the opposite tack. 
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Interpreting the application of a revenue statute to the District of Columbia, 
Marshall reasoned that the term “United States” designated the “whole . . . 
of the American empire,” so that territories were “not less within the United 
States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania.”210 Marshall waved away the 
complaint that the territories were taxed without representation—“that great 
principle which was asserted in our revolution”—by pointing to the promise 
that the territories “look[ed] forward to complete equality” upon 
admission.211 Yet eight years later, in American Insurance Company v. Canter, 
Marshall seemingly changed course.212 Echoing but not citing Clarke, he 
upheld the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction by Florida’s territorial courts, 
stating that Article III’s limitation on federal judicial power within the states 
“does not extend to the territories,” where “Congress exercises the combined 
powers of the general, and of a state government.”213 
The disappearance of Clarke mattered because the Northwest Territory 
increasingly became the normative yardstick against which subsequent 
territories were measured and, often, found lacking. In Dred Scott, for 
instance, Chief Justice Roger Taney sought to resolve the tension between 
Loughborough and Canter by distinguishing two kinds of federal territories.214 
In a challenge to the congressional power to bar slavery in the territories—a 
provision that first appeared in the Northwest Ordinance—Taney argued that 
federal power under the Territories Clause was limited solely to territories 
held at the time of the Constitution’s adoption; it did not encompass the 
subsequently acquired territory at issue in the case.215 In other words, Taney 
carved out an exception for the Northwest Ordinance that at once explained 
and rendered irrelevant what one dissent called a “settled construction of the 
Constitution for sixty years.”216 
Nearly a century after Ohio’s statehood, the Court issued arguably its 
most influential decision on territorial status, Downes v. Bidwell, the most 
significant of the early twentieth-century Insular Cases that sought to clarify 
the position of newly-acquired U.S. territories overseas.217 Although the 
case’s multiple opinions rested heavily on historical practice and precedent, 
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the Northwest Ordinance played a surprisingly minor role: writing for the 
majority, Justice Brown offered a flat declaration that, reading the Northwest 
Ordinance and the Constitution, “it can nowhere be inferred that the 
territories were considered a part of the United States.”218 Brown’s ultimate 
conclusion that the territory of Puerto Rico was, at least for the purposes 
before the Court, “not a part of the United States” vindicated St. Clair nearly 
a century after his death.219 Yet it was Justice White’s concurring opinion that 
proved the most durable and influential. Like Taney, White drew a sharp 
dichotomy between different territories, in his case distinguishing 
“incorporated” territories—those placed on the path toward statehood—and 
the “unincorporated” territories, where Congress had a freer hand.220 For 
White, the hallmarks of incorporation were the features of the Northwest 
Ordinance: the extension of constitutional rights and the promise of statehood.221 
Viewed in light of the early debates in the territories, Downes is a deeply 
ironic decision. The Justices’ disagreements over the territories’ 
constitutional status echoed, almost uncannily, the arguments between St. 
Clair and the Attorneys General over a century earlier. But, even though the 
reasoning in Downes relied extensively on prior practice, particularly 
administrative practice, the Justices fixated on the history of Louisiana, not 
the Northwest Territory.222 This omission likely reflected the unavailability 
of those prior administrative debates: unlike federal officials’ extensively cited 
views on the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase, the Attorneys’ 
General opinions on the status of the Northwest Territory were 
unpublished.223 Yet the absence of those debates allowed the Justices to offer 
a very different account of the history of territorial governance than that 
suggested by St. Clair and territorial citizens. Both the governor and his 
political opponents had viewed the Northwest Ordinance as a colonial 
document that controversially denied powers of self-government. A century 
later, however, Justice White spun a story of incorporation by ignoring the 
Ordinance’s imposition of federal rule and focusing exclusively on its promise 
of fundamental rights and eventual statehood: “at the adoption of the 
Constitution,” White lyricized, “all the native white inhabitants” of both 
states and territories were “endowed with citizenship” and “enjoy[ed] equal 
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rights and freedoms.”224 This change in perspective made early territorial 
governance seem the antithesis of the colonial order that the United States 
sought to establish in Puerto Rico and elsewhere. 
The Insular Cases thus reflected a bifurcation that began in the nineteenth 
century and still persists: Americans came to celebrate the Northwest 
Ordinance as embodying a new system of democratic expansion even as they 
feared subsequent territorial extensions as a betrayal of self-governance and 
an embrace of colonialism. Yet this dichotomy is only tenable by reading the 
Ordinance very partially, and by ignoring what people in the territories 
actually said and thought about it. Early Americans recognized that the 
Northwest Ordinance was not an unambiguous charter of liberty and 
democracy, and that the new American empire had buried within it many of 
the contradictions of the old. They struggled to reconcile this colonial legacy 
with the nation’s newly pronounced constitutional principles; some, like 
Arthur St. Clair, thought territorial governance so inconsistent with 
republican constitutionalism that the Northwest Territory could not really be 
part of the nation at all. 
Recovering the history of administrative constitutionalism in the 
Northwest Territory does little to solve the fundamental question of 
territorial status, on which the Insular Cases, for now, remain the final word. 
Like the better-known debates over Louisiana that ensued a decade later, the 
arguments among territorial officials in the Northwest Territory show mostly 
how contested and uncertain territorial status remained even after the 
adoption of the Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance. 
What these debates do demonstrate, however, is the mistaken assumption, 
embraced by many scholars, that the United States’ creation in an anti-
colonial revolt entrenched principles of uniformity, self-governance, and 
limited federal power at odds with imperialism.225 In fact, from the 
beginning, the United States, like its British predecessor, was an empire that 
excluded its subjects—even those white male property owners normally 
deemed citizens—from self-governance. One way to interpret this 
contradiction was as territorial citizens did, as the nation hypocritically failing 
to follow its own constitutional ideals. Yet a more accurate reading is to 
acknowledge the existence of another, countervailing set of constitutional 
norms, ones grounded in power and territorial sovereignty. The Northwest 
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Territory’s embrace of federal authority and deprivation of self-governance 
arguably embodied these imperial principles. In this sense, then, as well as in 
its much-heralded protection of individual rights, the Ordinance was a 
constitutional document. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1935, Congress created a commission to celebrate the one hundred-
fiftieth anniversary of the Northwest Ordinance, a law that, Congress 
proclaimed, had made “such a complete change in the method of governing 
new communities formed by colonization, that it will always rank as one of 
the greatest civil documents of all time.”226 A sweeping commemoration 
followed: over two million people came out to watch a reenacted westward 
procession to Ohio.227 At the procession’s final destination, after a pageant 
featuring a cast of over one thousand, the chairman of the local organizing 
committee gave a speech.228 He invoked the Ordinance as embodying “our 
cherished democratic forms of government” before offering a warning: that 
legacy, he urged, was now under threat from the expansion of the federal state 
under the New Deal.229 
It was chance that the Ordinance’s sesquicentennial coincided with the era 
that scholars identify as the rise of the modern administrative state in the 
United States, yet it was also fitting. As the chairman’s speech exemplified, 
the memory of the Ordinance had sharply diverged from the bitter 
complaints of territorial citizens: the document that they had decried as 
undemocratic had now become one of the founding texts of American 
democracy. A more accurate history might have suggested continuity between 
the Ordinance and the New Deal state rather than rupture, given the deep 
interconnections between the history of administration and the territories. 
In particular, administration and territorial governance posed similar 
conceptual challenges within early American constitutionalism. As Dan 
Hulsebosch has written, supporters of the Constitution believed they could 
solve the “long quest . . . for a binding imperial law” by transforming the 
United States from a system in which the “metropolis . . . imposed law on the 
periphery” into one founded on “a new kind of legality based on transcendent 
rules.”230 As many have traced, such transcendence could only be achieved by 
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shunting aside the exceptions—enslaved Africans,231 Native peoples,232 
women,233 children234—that troubled this project. The territories and 
administration presented a different sort of challenge. Both were 
constitutionalized holdovers from the earlier imperial regime that fit uneasily 
within a system in which governance purported to rest on consent and what 
would later be deemed “the rule of law” for legitimacy. Both seemed to cling 
to an older logic in which authority radiated hierarchically, outward and 
downward from the imperial center, rather than arising from popular 
sovereignty. Celebration of the Northwest Ordinance notwithstanding, then, 
the early United States failed to solve the legal problem of empire presented 
in the American Revolution—that is, how to ground legitimate authority and 
sovereignty within colonial dependencies. Or, rather, the United States 
“solved” the problem by sidelining it. 
The implications of this history for the ongoing fights over the 
constitutionality of the administrative state are twofold. As a descriptive 
matter, it demonstrates that a category of positive law akin to modern 
administrative law not only existed during the creation of the United States, 
but was explicitly sanctioned by its foundational documents. The denial of 
this history rests on a tendentious, results-oriented narrative that is 
constrained to ignore or distinguish away substantial contradictory evidence. 
This effort—to cast as “exceptional” instances that might otherwise trouble 
an unquestioning faith in the nation’s fundamental republicanism—echoes 
the broader history of the territories’ place within the U.S. constitutional 
imagination. From the Northwest Territory onward, many Americans 
similarly found it simpler to write the territories out of the United States 
altogether rather than to attempt to reconcile undemocratic territorial 
governance with the new nation’s ostensible commitments. 
But, while analogs of present-day administrative law have existed since 
the nation’s creation, they also at times proved a particularly congenial tool 
for serving normatively undesirable ends. Early on, territorial governance 
established the long-standing pattern—obvious in the current War on Terror 
or fights over immigration—in which federal administrators’ authority was at 
its height in places imagined as outside the constraints of “ordinary” 
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constitutional jurisdiction. There, beyond the limitations of federalism or 
democratic accountability, federal officials and military officers enjoyed 
seemingly unfettered authority, at least as depicted by territorial residents. 
I have argued elsewhere that the Constitution served as much to facilitate 
as to restrain imperialism.235 The supposed exceptions of administration and 
the territories suggest that this was true for what the document did not say 
as well as for what it did. The “holes” that others have identified in the 
Constitution concerning both administration and territorial governance—
more accurately broad grants of indefinite authority—facilitated the 
repurposing of older imperial law and created spaces where constitutional 
silence aggrandized federal power. These omissions helped construct an 
imperial power grounded on inequalities even as the new nation celebrated 
the comforting myth that it was a new kind of empire founded on equality 
and liberty. 
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